Further evidence

This online appendix complements the main case studies presented in the article with some further evidence from three further African cases where turnovers have not lead to democratization. Ultimately, it would have been desirable to study more African cases where a turnover clearly caused democratization. However, as already discussed, there are few success stories on the African continent, apart from Ghana. In the previous sections, Ghana was contrasted with the cases of Kenya and Senegal to show how electoral uncertainty created by low party system institutionalization decreased the willingness of newly elected regimes to democratize. Kenya and Senegal were chosen because of their similarities with Ghana. In this section, further evidence will be provided, indicating how low party system institutionalization hinders democratization after turnovers.

Levitsky and Way classified three other African cases, Malawi, Madagascar and Zambia, as “non-democratized with turnovers” (presented in table 2). These cases are not as comparable to Ghana as Kenya and Senegal, since all of them experienced turnovers already in their first multi-party election. However, these additional cases are useful as an illustration of the more general applicability of the theory.

All the additional cases show how low party system institutionalization has hindered democratization after turnovers. In Madagascar Albert Zafy and his, Hery Velona (Living Forces), won the country’s first presidential election in 1993. However, the case is special as the newly elected government was too weak to cling on to power for a full term and could not benefit from incumbent advantages in the subsequent election. It is hence problematic to sufficiently measure the value on the dependent variable. Although it is not possible to see
how Albert Zafy and his newly elected party would have handled the uncertainty of elections, it is possible to see how the party used its incumbency to strengthen its own position.

Marcus and Ratsimbaharison describe the party as: “an electoralist catch-all party distinguished by its shallow organization, superficial and vague ideology, and attempts to aggregate a wide range of social interests with the overriding goal of winning elections and governing.”¹ The party and its coalition were extremely unstable, and as a consequence Zafy experienced large problems keeping the legislature loyal. After having clashed with the prime minister, President Zafy instigated constitutional reform to move power away from the parliament and towards the president’s office. After a constitutional referendum, the president was given the power to appoint the prime minister, provoking the sitting prime minister to immediately resign and the parliament to turn on the president. In 1996, the legislature voted in favor of impeachment of the president on the charge of corruption with a broad majority. A temporary administration was subsequently put in office and although Zafy again ran for president, he could not benefit from being in office.

Malawi essentially developed a three-party system with the introduction of multipartyism in 1994. The election featured a ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP), under Kamuzu Banda, and two different opposition parties, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). The parties lacked stable roots in society, with election campaigns fought primarily on the personal appeal of the party leaders and voting patterns clearly established along regional lines: the northern region voted primarily for AFORD, the central supported MCP, and the south voted for UDF.²
Despite a severely biased media, and state resources being used for Banda’s election campaign, UDF’s Bakili Muluzi won the presidential election with 47% of the vote. However, UDF only secured 84 of the 176 seats in parliament and hence fell just short of a legislative majority. As a consequence, UDF tried to create a coalition with AFORD after the election. AFORD declined this proposal and instead surprisingly aligning itself with the old authoritarian MCP. This alliance was, however, rather short-lived. After just a few months, AFORD decided to leave the MCP alliance and enter the UDF government. The decision came after having been offered five cabinet positions and, most importantly, a newly created second vice-president office, designated for the AFORD Chairman, Chakufwa Chihana.\(^3\)

Chihana, once again pulled out of the government, and left his office in 1996. However, several of the AFORD ministers remained in the government. In the 1999 election, AFORD was once again back in an alliance with MCP. They issued one common candidate, with MCP’s Gwanda Chakuamba as the presidential candidate and Chihana as the running mate.\(^4\)

These shifting alliances vividly demonstrate the volatility in Malawian politics.\(^5\) The UDF government had to rule with unclear majorities and high electoral uncertainty, while the MCP-AFORD alliance was an objective threat to the survival of the Muluzi regime. Similar to Senegal and Kenya, the subsequent election was not conducted on a level playing field. The incumbent government clearly biased the media, and state resources were used for UDF campaigning.\(^6\)

As in Malawi, Zambia had a turnover already in its first multiparty election. The 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections were marked by economic decline, caused largely by international pressure. In the election, Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) lost by a great margin to Frederick Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty
Democracy (MMD). Kaunda had held power since 1964 and possessed clear incumbent advantages. The government controlled the media and election authorities were heavily in favor of the incumbent. Most importantly, the election was held under a state of emergency, allowing the government to deny citizens their civil rights. 7

The MMD was not an institutionalized and stable party. It was formed as an anti-UNIP alliance, and showed clear signs of fragmentation after it assumed office. Several senior members of MMD deserted the party in the period 1992-1994, most of them instead joining the newly created National Party (NP). 8 After half the party’s term in office, 18 ministers and deputies had either resigned or been dismissed from the government. 9 Much like the NARC government in Kenya and the PDS government in Senegal, MMD dropped its ambitious plans to instigate constitutional reform. Instead of curtailing the powers of the executive and strengthening the role of parliament, it introduced constitutional amendments to increase its chances for reelection. 10 The constitution was changed to abolish the two-round presidential elections, thereby increasing the prospects for incumbent reelection. Even more controversially, the constitution barred candidates with a non-Zambian parent to participate in the presidential election. This amendment was designed to prevent the opposition front-runner, Kaunda, from participating. As a consequence, UNIP decided to boycott the election. 11 According to Burnell: “Later signs of a UNIP revival, coming on top of the defections from MMD that produced the National Party (1993), are credited with panicking MMD MPs into legislating the 1996 constitutional amendments.” 12

The 1996 election showed many of the same democratic deficits as the 1991 contest; however, this time MMD was the favored party, not UNIP. In addition to the constitutional amendments, MMD used state resources to campaign, and biased the media and the electoral commission to its advantage. 13
To sum up, these additional cases support the argument made in the main case studies. Although Madagascar is somewhat hard to analyze, the government tried to concentrate power to surpass the problem of a disloyal parliament. In Zambia and Malawi, like in Kenya and Senegal, the newly elected regimes clearly employed inherited incumbent advantages in subsequent elections, largely to handle electoral uncertainty caused by an unstable ruling coalition.

1 Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, ‘Political Parties’.
3 Ihonvbere, ‘From Despotism to Democracy’.
4 Chinsinga, ‘Lack of Alternative Leadership’.
5 Rakner et al., ‘Fission and Fusions’.
7 Panter-Brick, ‘Prospects for Democracy’.
9 Burnell, ‘Building on the Past?’, 399.
10 Kees van Donge, ‘Reflections on Donors’.
11 Rakner and Svåsand (note 87).
13 Rakner and Svåsand, ‘Stuck in Transition’.

List of references


Appendix 1: Office terms in statistical test


Note: The sample is derived from the classification of Hadenius and Teorell (note 12), using their category “limited multiparty non-dominant regimes” a category essentially capturing “competitive authoritarianism”. In this category, Hadenius and Teorell include cases that in a given year have a government that has been elected in a popular and recurrent election, where at least one real opposition candidate was allowed to participate, but where the democracy score is less than 7.5 on a 10-point (combined inverted Freedom House and Polity) scale. Moreover, to reach the threshold for competitiveness, the largest party may not have won more than 67% of the seats in parliament. For an election to be included, the country must be classified as “non-dominant limited multiparty” the year before the election and the term must be finished by 2008. This implicates that founding elections are automatically excluded from the sample. Similarly, elections that put a country below the level of democracy and those where the election puts a country over the threshold for competitiveness are not included (i.e. elections where the country was a democracy, closed authoritarian or dominant-party authoritarian regime the year before the election). Hadenius and Teorell do not classify regimes identically to Levitsky and Way (note 1). Hence, some of the countries discussed in the paper are not included in the statistical sample.